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Sovereignty vs. Internationalism and Where
United States Courts Should Find
International Law
Joseph Keller*
I.

Introduction

As United States courts have faced increasingly difficult issues of
international law, they have struggled to ascertain and decree the proper
role of various international law sources within the U.S. constitutionally
based system of federal law.' The current state of uncertainty over the
future of international law in U.S. courts has sparked considerable debate
among academics, as well as among politicians and in American culture
more broadly.2 The first section of this paper explores the policy
concerns and theoretical issues underlying the debate about the proper
role of international law in U.S. courts. After examining the tensions
between competing theories of sovereignty and internationalism, this
* Associate, O'Melveny & Meyers, New York. B.A. University of Illinois
Urbana-Champaign, J.D. University of Michigan. Former clerk for the Eastern District
of Virginia. The author wishes to thank Andrew W. Keller for helpful comments and
suggestions.
1. See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom.
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604
(9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Flores v.
S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003).
2. See Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution,
and Non-Self Execution, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1557 (2003); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 2260 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw
as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 816
(1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Is InternationalLaw Really State Law?, 111 HARv. L. REV.
1824, 1825-26 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary
InternationalLaw: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 371, 371-72 (1997); Jordan J. Paust, Customary InternationalLaw and Human
Rights Treaties are Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 301 (1999); A. Mark
Weisburd, American Judges and International Law, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1475
(2003); see also H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004) (there were sixty sponsors of this
resolution to limit the use of foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements in judicial
determinations concerning the meaning of U.S. laws).
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paper explains why concerns of sovereignty and democratic
accountability counsel in favor of restricting the manner in which judges
declare and interpret international law in U.S. courts.
The second section of this paper applies the conclusion reached in
the first section by analyzing and critiquing several important decisions
recently issued by U.S. courts involving the interpretation of
international law. Challenging issues recently confronted by federal
courts include the proper interpretation of treaties and other international
agreements, the status of customary international law in U.S. courts, the
status of academic works, and the separation of powers concerns raised
when the judicial branch incorporates customary
international law into
3
Congress.
from
authorization
without
law
U.S.
This paper concludes that non-self-executing treaties and nonbinding international agreements cannot provide a cause of action for
plaintiffs in U.S. courts, and cannot trump inconsistent statutes or other
federal law. This paper also takes the position that courts should look to
the writings of academics (including the Restatement) only as secondary
evidence of the content of customary international law. As a further
matter, this paper discusses the distinction between customary
international law and jus cogens and the proper role of each as a source
of law in U.S. courts. This paper argues that U.S. courts are not bound to
apply a rule of customary international law unless the U.S. has assented
to that rule through the appropriate democratic processes.
II.

Sovereignty vs. Internationalism: The Competing Visions
Underlying the Debate

Why all the controversy over the proper role of international law in
U.S. courts? At the heart of this debate lies the competition between
traditionally held notions of state sovereignty and a world view that may
be termed internationalism.
A.

Sovereignty and DemocraticAccountability

In analyzing these competing theories, it is important to flesh out in
more detail exactly what is meant by "sovereignty. ' 4 Specifically, the
concept of democratic accountability is central to the ideal of state
sovereignty. Professor Weisburd frames this issue as a question of
legitimacy: "More fundamentally, by relying on sources other than state
3. See cases cited supra note 1; see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
4. See Curtis A. Bradley, InternationalDelegations, the Structural Constitution,
and Non-Self Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1596 n.2 (2003) (discussing the lack of
precision inherent in the term "sovereignty").
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behavior to determine the content of CIL [customary international law], a
court effectively transfers legislative power to groups with little right to
claim it-such as judges of international tribunals whose authority is
carefully circumscribed in their founding instruments-or no right at
all-such as legal academics." 5 At the heart of this idea is the concern
that law will be made by actors not politically accountable for their
actions.
In an ideal democracy, politically accountable individuals and
groups make the laws and important policy decisions. It should not be
surprising then that courts should be concerned when lawmaking power
is delegated to international actors completely outside the government:
By transferring legal authority from U.S. actors to international
actors-actors that are physically and culturally more distant from,
and not directly responsible to, the U.S. electorate-these delegations
may entail a dilution of domestic political accountability. This
accountability concern may be heightened by the lack of transparency
associated with some international decisionmaking, which in turn
may increase monitoring
costs and the potential for what economists
6
call "rent-seeking."
As noted by Bradley, concerns about political accountability are
even more troublesome when the actors to whom power is delegated are
so far removed from the individuals over whom they exercise power.
Furthermore, problems of transparency afflict not only traditional
international decision making by international institutions (such as the
WTO), but also the emergence of rules of customary international law.
A U.S. court searching for a rule of customary international law is not
likely to find a legislative history revealing the true intent behind the
state actions giving rise to the rule. How can a court answer the question
(often crucial to analysis of customary international law) of whether a
state acted out of a sense of legal obligation?
The possibility that courts will incorrectly look to academics to
define the rules of customary international law raises even more
disturbing transparency concerns. What personal ambitions, motives or
prejudices might underlie the writings of an academic is anyone's guess.
The court in Yousef persuasively made this point: "This seemingly
idealistic position has been rejected by other scholars, who note that it is
'obvious' that 'subjective factors' and 'national and other prejudices'
freely may enter into the writings of publicists, particularly those who
'see themselves to be propagating new and better views.' ' 7 Indeed, one
5. Weisburd, supra note 2, at 1531.
6. Bradley, supranote 2, at 1558.
7. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 102 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting IAN

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:2

hardly knows whether an academic actually believes the theories set
forth in his or her own writings. An article by a law professor may
appear in a prestigious journal, boldly and authoritatively declaring X to
be a well established rule of customary international law, with great
academic pomp and bravado, yet one cannot know if this article was put
together hastily in a desperate attempt to meet a publishing deadline. Or
perhaps more likely, given the strict criteria for law review articles (a
topic should be "ripe" and present a new idea not "preempted" by
another author), the professor merely espoused his/her theory because it
was new or unique, and not because it is well supported logically or
advisable as a matter of public policy. For these reasons, and for the
obvious lack of political accountability of academics, academic writings
should occupy the bottom rung on the ladder of sources courts examine
to ascertain a rule of international law.
These transparency and political accountability concerns support the
view that courts should not look to international law that has not been
incorporated into U.S. law to provide a rule of decision in a case.
Problems abound with this approach. For example, how can litigants
reasonably have notice of what their rights are in court when a judge may
look to a source of international law completely external to the properly
enacted statutes of the U.S.? How will the attorneys advise litigants of
the chances of success on the merits when judges may (or may not)
decide what result they desire in a case and then search international law
until coming up with a source that supports their desired result?8 This
inappropriate result-driven analysis is aided by law professors who
casually affix the tag of "customary international law" on any norm they
deem morally significant enough to warrant the status of that label. The
preferable method of judicial analysis would exercise some caution,
restraint, and a measure of deference to the legislative branch.
B. Internationalism
Internationalism, as used in this paper, refers to the movement of
thinkers who would like to see the courts incorporate international law
directly into federal law without any independent directive from
Congress. One important feature of internationalism is the way it
envisions the role of the national political branches:
"National
legislatures play, at best, a decidedly secondary role in the process of
supranational policymaking." 9 One justification for this limitation on the
24 (5th ed. 1999)).
8. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586-605 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).

BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

9.

Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Characterof
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national government is the need "to address problems beyond the
effective political control of even the largest individual states."' 10
Internationalists seem frustrated with the government of the U.S. and its
policies, especially with respect to international human rights law. In
addition to the U.S. practice of declaring treaties non-self-executing,
other examples of frustrating U.S. positions include the U.S. refusal to
support the International Criminal Court and the U.S. practice of
suggesting immunity on behalf of foreign governments in Alien Tort Act
lawsuits.1
Indeed, the internationalist view seems tied in very closely with
concerns about individual human rights and the relationship between the
individual and the sovereign state in the context of human rights.
Traditionally held notions of state sovereignty were questioned in
aftermath of the atrocities of World War II: "The unspeakable atrocities
and gross human rights violations of the World War II era highlighted a
new responsibility of the world community to respect, promote and
protect the fundamental human rights of the individual."' 12 In response to
these concerns, the international community produced the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights as well as the Covenant on Political and
Civil Rights, and the Covenant on Social and Economic Rights. These
instruments signify an international movement towards protecting
individual rights.
Inevitably, this movement had some impact on notions of state
sovereignty: "It must be stressed that the very notion of the existence of
human rights of individuals necessarily implies a restriction or limitation
upon the sovereign power of states and governments."'' 3 In other words,
at some point state sovereignty intersects with human rights, and one or
the other must give way: "Regardless of the underlying philosophical or
theoretical basis, no nation today may claim a sovereign right to violate
those fundamental and unalienable universal rights."' 4 As a matter of
international law, this statement may be correct;: in cases of actual
violation of fundamental human rights, a state may not claim a sovereign
right to commit those abuses. Note, however, that for purposes of
domestic liability in U.S. courts, there is no general exception to
sovereign immunity for violations of human rights law or blatant
Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 628,

632-33 (1999).
10. Id. (quoting Wolf Sauter, The Economic Constitution of the European Union, 4
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 27, 66 (1998)).
11. See Doe I v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
12. Judge Edward D. Re, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Effective
Remedies and the Domestic Courts, 33 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 137, 139-40 (2003).
13. Id. at 140.
14. Id.
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violations of international law. 5 This does not mean that the U.S. has
chosen to encourage or tolerate human rights abuses as a policy matter or
to acquiesce in a state's claim of right to commit human rights abuses. It
merely indicates that some sovereign actions in violation of international
law will not fit any of the exceptions to sovereign immunity in the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). When this proves to be the
case, the U.S. court must dismiss the lawsuit without prejudice on
procedural grounds for lack of jurisdiction.
A different case is presented when the issue involves international
law sources in U.S. courts and whether or not they create private rights
of action. For example, it may be correct to state that the U.S. cannot
assert a sovereign right to commit human rights abuses in violation of
international law, but when the U.S. declares that an international human
rights treaty is non-self-executing, it does not thereby violate
international law. A declaration of non-self execution is not an
endorsement of the commission of human rights abuses. It merely
declares that the treaty in question will not of itself provide a private
cause of action cognizable in U.S. courts. International law does not
require the U.S. to open its courts to civil claims based on violations of
international human rights treaties. Furthermore, a non-self-executing
treaty does not deny a cause of action in U.S. courts for civil wrongs
based on human rights abuses. A declaration to such a treaty merely
provides that the treaty itself will not provide a cause of action. Plaintiffs
may still pursue justice under some other source of law. For example, a
plaintiff suing an official of a foreign government for an act of state
sponsored terrorism has a cause of action under the Flatow Amendment
to the FSIA,' 6 irrespective of whether any human rights treaty fails to
provide a cause of action. 17
Therefore the internationalist concern over non-self-executing
treaties seems misplaced. Undoubtedly, victims of human rights abuses
or other violations of international law have a legitimate interest in
pursuing justice. Nevertheless, it is not the role of judges (with the
assistance of law professors) to circumvent the legislative process and
create private rights of action for these victims from international sources
This method of judicial
of law not incorporated domestically.
interpretation (if it may be termed that) has no logical stopping point and
provides federal judges with unfettered discretion to declare the law as
they think it should be, rather than as provided for by Congress or the

15. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2005).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 at (a)(7).
17. See Joseph Keller, The Flatow Amendment and State Sponsored Terrorism, 28
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1029 (2005).
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legitimate common law tradition of U.S. courts. The founders of the
Constitution of the United States created three separate branches of
government in order to guard against precisely this type of unchecked
power and its inherent dangers of subjective bias, abuse and arbitrariness.
III.

A.

Lessons From the Judicial Battlefield: Recent Decisions in United
States Courts
Al Odah v. United States: The Legal Status of Non-Self-Executing
Treaties and Other InternationalAgreements in U.S. Courts

It is useful to begin examination of the role of international law in
U.S. courts by looking at the manner in which courts have treated the
issue in recent litigation. In Al Odah v. United States, the plaintiffs were
detainees captured during hostilities in Afghanistan and held at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba. 18 They brought three actions
contesting the legality and conditions of their confinement at
Guantanamo Bay. In addition to seeking habeas corpus relief, the
plaintiffs invoked the Alien Tort Act,1 9 alleging that the U.S. imprisoned
them in violation of treaties and international law. 20 The D.C. Circuit
held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the Constitution
did not entitle the plaintiffs, as aliens without property or presence in the
United States, to due process of law. 21 As additional grounds for
dismissal, the court held that Cuba, pursuant to a lease with the U.S., had
proper jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' actions.22 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that jurisdiction existed because habeas corpus acts not
upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in
alleged unlawful custody,
as long as that custodian can be reached by
23
service of process.
While the majority opinion in the D.C. Circuit disposed of the case
on jurisdictional grounds, a concurring opinion by Judge Randolph
addressed the important issue of the proper role of international law in
U.S. courts.24 Judge Randolph's opinion highlighted one particularly
controversial question of international law: to what extent and under
what conditions do human rights treaties create private rights of action in
U.S. courts? Judge Randolph pointed out that the plaintiffs in Al Odah
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
broader
24.

Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005).
Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1144.
Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1142-44.
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). The Supreme Court did not discuss the
issues of treaty law addressed in Judge Randolph's opinion.
Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1145.
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petitioned the court to take the position that a cause of action for treaty
violations is cognizable under the Alien Tort Act.2 5 As Judge Randolph
noted, construing the Alien Tort Act so broadly would "grant aliens
greater rights in the nation's courts than American citizens enjoy. '' 26 The
better answer, as explained by Judge Randolph, is that treaties do not
create private rights of action in U.S. courts unless they are self27
In other words, unless Congress explicitly provides for a
executing.
cause of action, a non-self-executing treaty by itself will not provide one.
An early U.S. Supreme Court decision recognized that a non-selfexecuting treaty "addresses itself to the political, not the judicial
department; and the legislature must execute the [treaty] before it can
become a rule for the Court. ''28 Nevertheless, the plaintiffs in Al Odah
attempted to base a cause of action on the non-self-executing Geneva
Convention of 1949.29 Furthermore, as Judge Randolph pointed out,
plaintiffs in other cases have based a cause of action under the Alien Tort
Act on customary international law as derived from the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).3 ° Not only is this
multilateral agreement non-self-executing, but the Senate ratified the
agreement on the basis that it would "not create a private cause of action
in U.S. courts.,, 3 1 As one scholar aptly asserted:
In short, if the ICCPR is self-executing, and since the U.S. has
ratified it, individuals would be able to avail themselves of the United
States court system for vindication of violations of the rights the
ICCPR proclaims. If, on the other hand, a treaty is non-selfexecuting, it does not have an immediate effect in the domestic legal
system of the United States. Further action by the political branches
of government in the form of implementing legislation is needed to
incorporate or implement the treaty into domestic law. As such,
despite the fact that treaties are the law of the land, the United States
(absent implementing legislation) to
courts would not apply the treaty
3
disputes which come before it.

25. Id. at 1146.
26. Id. In Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme Court held "28 U.S.C. § 1350 explicitly
confers the privilege of suing for an actionable 'tort... committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States' on aliens alone." 542 U.S. 466, 563 (2004).
27. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1146. Judge Randolph includes a long string cite of case
law supporting his point.
28. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 254 (1829).
29. AlOdah, 321 F.3dat 1147.
30. Id. (discussing Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1383-84

(1998)).
31.

Id. (quoting S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, at 9, 19, 23 (1992)).

32. Brenda Sue Thornton, The New International Jurisprudence on the Right to
Privacy: A Head-On Collision with Bowers v. Hardwick, 58 ALB. L. REv. 725, 766-67
(1995).
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By allowing a claim to proceed on the basis of the ICCPR, a court would
allow plaintiffs to circumvent and indeed defy the will of Congress.
A judicial decision recognizing a cause of action where Congress
has explicitly acted to deny one raises separation of powers issues.
However, the theory that non-self-executing treaties provide a cause of
action in U.S. courts is not without support in the academic literature.33
Professor Paust takes the position that customary international law is
federal law and is "directly incorporable, at least for civil sanction and
jurisdictional purposes, without the need for some other statutory base. 34
More specifically, with respect to treaties Paust claims:
The Supremacy Clause mandates that "all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution of Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding," not that some treaties or only "selfexecuting" treaties have that effect. Certainly a mere declaration of a
President, even with full consent of the Senate, cannot alter a
constitutional command. Thus, a declaration of non-self-execution,
law, is unconstitutional and void
even if not void under international
35
under the Supremacy Clause.
In his attempt to define declarations of non-self-execution as void under
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, Paust misses the point.
Declarations to a treaty (as well as reservations and understandings) do
not contradict the treaty, but (at the very least for purposes of domestic
law) are in fact a part of the treaty itself and cannot be selectively
weeded out of the context of the larger treaty text. What Paust describes
as the "constitutional command" of the treaty should be discovered from
the totality of its components, including the declaration of non-selfexecution. In fact, Paust's language betrays his purpose because it is the
"mere" declaration of a President, along with the "full consent of the
Senate," which renders a treaty constitutionally valid in the first instance.
A treaty is not "made" as provided for in the Supremacy Clause until
these conditions have been satisfied. It is inappropriate and incorrect for
Paust to separate the legal effect of the text of a treaty from its
declarations, reservations, and understandings. A court applying Paust's
method would recognize a constitutionally invalid document: a treaty
different from that consented to and ratified by the Senate.
Other commentators provide a more persuasive view of treaty
33.

See Jordan J. Paust, Customary InternationalLaw and Human Rights Treaties

are Law of the United States, 20 MICH.J. INT'L L. 301 (1999).

34.
35.

Id. at 305.
Id. at 324.
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interpretation in the context of private lawsuits in federal court:
Under the requirement of self-executing treaties, a treaty that is not
"self-executing" cannot be enforced by private parties unless it has
been implemented by statute. The mere fact that a treaty exists, and
that if adhered to would work to the benefit of the plaintiff, does not
necessarily give the plaintiff a right to prevail. The reason is that [a]

treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It
depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the
honor of the governments which are party to it.... [W]ith all this the
judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress. But a
treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon
the citizens or subjects of one of the nations ... which partake of the
nature of municipal law, and which are capable of enforcement as
between private parties in the courts of the country....

The

Constitution of the United States places such
36 provisions as these in
the same category as other laws of Congress.
It is important to observe that a plaintiff relying in part on a nonself-executing treaty is not necessarily defeated in his attempt to bring a
lawsuit in federal court. For example, a plaintiff may yet succeed in
bringing a claim under some domestic legislation or under a common
law theory of recovery in tort law. 37 These other sources of law may
grant plaintiffs legal rights not vested in individuals by treaty.
Closer examination of the Constitution casts doubt on the theory
that the Judiciary, without authorization from Congress, possesses the
power to define and incorporate international law into U.S. law. Article
I, Section 8, Clause 10 of the Constitution gives Congress the power to
"define and punish ...

Offenses against the Law of Nations."

Judge

Randolph makes a crucial historical observation regarding this clause of
the Constitution: "[t]he Framers' original draft merely stated that
Congress had the power to punish offenses against the law of nations, but
when Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania objected that the law of
nations was 'often too vague and deficient to be a rule,' the clause was
amended to its present form., 38 This history of Article I, Section 8,
Clause 10 supports the understanding that the Framers changed their
original draft in order to provide Congress, not the Judiciary, with the
power to define offenses against the law of nations. Under this view,
Congress bears the constitutional authority of affirmatively incorporating
principles of international law into the laws of the United States. As a
necessary corollary of this principle, U.S. courts cannot infer a cause of
36.

Lea Brilmayer, InternationalLaw In American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100
L.J. 2277, 2303-04 (1991).
37. Id.

YALE

38.

AlOdah, 321 F.3dat 1147.
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action based on violations of international law as defined in a non-selfexecuting treaty or non-binding U.N. resolution.
B.

United States v. Yousef.' The Legal Status of the Writings of
Academics and Other Scholarly "Sources" of InternationalLaw in
U.S.Courts

If courts cannot properly recognize a cause of action based on a
violation of international law as defined in a non-self-executing treaty, it
is even more incorrect for courts to allow the writings of academics to
define international law and the rights it provides in U.S. courts. 39 In
United States v. Yousef, the defendants appealed from convictions for
conspiracy to bomb commercial airplanes in Asia and the World Trade
Center in 1993.40 The Second Circuit held that the District Court had
jurisdiction over the actions of the defendants, but that the District Court
had erred in partly basing jurisdiction on the universality principle of
customary international law because it had relied on the statements of
commentators instead of on the practice and customs of States.4'
In reaching this conclusion, the court attacked the self-proclaimed
status of international law professors: "This notion-that professors of
international law enjoy a special competence to prescribe the nature of
customary international law wholly unmoored from legitimating
territorial or national responsibilities, the interests and practices of States,
or (in countries such as ours) the processes of democratic consent-may
not be unique, but it is certainly without merit. 42 The court provided
this analysis in response to the particularly bold assertion of academic
power by Professor Louis B. Sohn (the emeritus Bemis Professor of
International Law at the Harvard Law School):
I submit that states really never make international law on the subject
39. A useful analogy may be drawn to art. XXXVIII(l) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, which provides a list of international law sources for
consideration by the court, with the writings of academics occupying the bottom position:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
40. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 78 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
933 (2003), post conviction proceedings, remanded by 395 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2005).
41. Yousef, 327 F.3d at 96-100.
42. Id. at 102.
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of human rights. It is made by the people that care; the professors,

the writers of textbooks and casebooks, and the authors of articles in
the leading international law journals. ....
This is the way
international law43 is made, not by states, but by "silly" professors
writing books[.]

As the court notes, Sohn's theory of international lawmaking by
professors is disturbing in part because professors lack democratic
accountability.
In addition to their obvious lack of democratic
accountability, many such professors are isolated within the ivy lined
walls of academia, having practiced law for only a few short years, if at
all. Therefore, the writings of law professors provide even weaker
evidence of the proper role of international law in U.S. courts than do
non-self-executing treaties or other non-binding international
agreements, which at least reflect the thinking and aspirational (although
not binding) goals of states.
Implicit in Sohn's language is the notion that academics "care"
about international human rights law in a way that states do not. This
questionable notion ignores the practical realities faced by states as
actors in the international arena. States, unlike law professors, must
weigh the practical consequences of incorporating international human
rights concepts into domestic law. The United States Congress, as a
legislator, might decline to incorporate into domestic law particular
human rights concepts out of concern for the potential foreign policy
ramifications produced by judicial recognition of an ever-expanding list
of vaguely defined human rights norms. For example, suppose the U.S.
by statute explicitly declined to provide federal jurisdiction over certain
torts committed against aliens abroad (assuming, for purposes of
argument, the constitutionality of such legislation). One purpose of this
hypothetical legislation might be to advance U.S. foreign policy goals
and diplomatic relations by preventing U.S. courts from entertaining
lawsuits against foreign sovereigns (including unfriendly sovereigns such
as Iran and Syria). The conduct by the executive branch of diplomatic
relations, especially with potentially dangerous states, is a sensitive and
often difficult task. By utilizing the advice and assistance of uniquely
qualified and informed experts in the executive branch, Congress may
for a variety of legitimate policy reasons decline to incorporate into
domestic law otherwise laudable human rights norms. Therefore,
passage of this hypothetical legislation would not demonstrate that the
United States (or any other sovereign) does not "care" about human
rights, rather it would signal that states must balance human rights
43. Id. at 101 (quoting Louis B. Sohn, Sources of InternationalLaw, 25 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 399, 399, 401 (1996)).
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concerns against other legitimate goals of the sovereign. By contrast,
law professors may safely champion the cause of human rights without
closely examining the competing interests of the state.
Other academics have humbly disavowed the self-aggrandizing
theories of colleagues such as Professor Sohn. 4 Professor Weisburd
correctly notes that the writings of scholars are only as reliable as the
scholar's sources and must be treated only as secondary evidence of the
content of international law:
Put simply, and despite protestations to the contrary by some scholars
(or "publicists" or "jurists"), a statement by the most highly qualified
scholars that international law is x cannot trump evidence that the
treaty practice or customary practices of States is otherwise, much
less trump a statute or constitutional provision of the United States at
variance with x. This is only to emphasize the point that scholars do
not make law, and that it would be profoundly inconsistent with the
law-making processes within and between States for courts to permit
scholars to do so by relying45upon their statements, standing alone, as
sources of international law.
Weisburd makes the key point that the hierarchy of sources of law in
U.S. courts begins with the Constitution and statutes of the U.S. and
continues downward from there. A scholarly pronouncement at odds
with one of these sources must therefore fail. Further, when U.S. courts
determine the content of international law, the actual practice of states
trumps the writings of law professors. To hold otherwise would allow
law professors to govern international law as "philosopher kings,
imposing their ideas of what the law should be under the guise of
describing the law's content. 4 6 Courts should be careful to ascertain
international law as actually practiced by states rather than as law
professors believe it should be practiced.47
The Yousef court also correctly criticized the District Court's
reliance on the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States. 48 The court held that the District Court's misplaced
reliance on the Restatement had been a critical error leading to the
incorrect conclusion of universal jurisdiction over Yousef.49 Explaining

44.

See A. Mark Weisburd, American Judges and International Law, 36 VAND. J.

TRANSNAT'L L. 1475

45.

(2003).

Id. at 1508.

46. Id. at 1478.
47. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("Such works are resorted to
by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law
ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.").
48. Yousef, 327 F.3d at 99.
49.

Id.
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the rationale behind its conclusion, the court noted of the Restatement:
"Such works at most provide evidence of the practice of states, and then
only insofar as they rest on factual and accurate descriptions of the past
practices of states, not on projections of future trends or the advocacy of
the 'better rule."' 50 As the court notes, the Restatement is merely the
cumulative work of a group of academics (the American Law Institute
(ALI)) and does not necessarily reflect the actual practice of states. The
Yousef court examined the ALl handbook and discovered that "the AL
handbook for reporters instructs that reporters are 'not compelled to
adhere to... a preponderating balance of authority but [are] instead
expected to propose the better rule and provide the rationale for choosing
it.' 5'1 The Restatement as a source of customary international law thus
suffers from the same fundamental flaw as the writings of academics: it
does not reflect international law as actually practiced by states but
instead reflects attempts by individuals to create a perceived "better" rule
of international law. United States courts should not give merely
aspirational rules pronounced by the ALl the status of customary
international law until such rules accurately describe the customs and
practice of states.
C. The Alvarez-Machain Decision and the Legal Status of Customary
InternationalLaw (CIL) and Jus Cogens in U.S. Courts
Having established that the content of customary international law
should be defined by reference to the practice of states rather than the
writings of academics or other scholarly sources, the next analytical
question is: where must a court locate the practice of states; and what
level of state practice is sufficient to give rise to a rule of customary
international law cognizable in U.S. courts? Again it is helpful to
examine an important recent decision in 52federal court to help frame this
issue: Alvarez-Machain v. United States.
In Alvarez-Machain, the plaintiff (Alvarez-Machain) is a Mexican
national who was kidnapped in Mexico by Mexican citizens acting on
behalf of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and brought
to the U.S. to be tried for his role in the murder and torture of DEA agent
Enrique Camarena-Salazar. 5 3 Alvarez-Machain was acquitted for his
50.
51.

Id.
Id. at 100 (quoting The Restatement Process, 10 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 2, 6

(2000)).
52. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003); rev'd, 542 U.S.
692 (2004), vacated, 374 F.3d 1384 (2004). This paper will focus primarily on the Ninth
Circuit decision.
53. These cases have a long and complicated procedural history. See United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Alvarez-Machain I"),
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role in the murder of Salazar and subsequently sued a Mexican national
under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) and the United States under the

Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging various torts and violations of
international law in connection with his forcible abduction from Mexico.
A central issue in the case is whether the abduction of AlvarezMachain constituted a "'violation of the law of nations,' a predicate to
54
federal court jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA")."
The ATCA provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States., 55 Therefore, in order
to prove his claim under the ATCA, Alvarez-Machain needs to prove the
defendant(s) violated the law of nations.
The Ninth Circuit held that "the unilateral, nonconsensual
extraterritorial arrest and detention of Alvarez were arbitrary and in
violation of the law of nations under the ATCA. 56 The court therefore
held the defendant Mexican policeman liable under the ATCA and
reversed the district court's dismissal of the FTCA claims against the
U.S. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the detention of Alvarez
violated no norm of customary international law well defined enough to
support a cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute: "[A] single illegal
detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful
authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary
international law so well defined as to support the creation of a federal
remedy. 57
A dissenting opinion in the Ninth Circuit by Judge O-Scannlain,
joined by Judges Rymer, Kleinfeld and Tallman, sets forth a persuasive
interpretation of the role of customary international law in U.S. courts.
The dissent frames the issue simply:
Do American law enforcement agents violate well-established
principles of American jurisprudence when they apprehend a dulyindicted suspect outside the confines of our nation's borders? The
answer is clearly no; the United States has neither now nor ever
agreed to an asserted international
law principle prohibiting the
58
practice of transborder abduction.
Crucial to the dissent's position is the focus on whether or not the U.S.
has ever actually consented to the alleged rule of international law
rev'd, 504 U.S. 655, 669-70 ("Alvarez-Machain I").
54. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 608 (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003)).

55.

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005).

56. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 620.
57. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2769 (2004).
58. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 646.
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prohibiting transborder abduction. The U.S. is not bound to recognize in
its courts a claim based on a norm of customary international law it has
not subscribed to. The dissent would like to see evidence that such a
prohibition has been incorporated into U.S. law by the appropriate
political process: "[A] proper historical understanding of the ATCA
compels the conclusion that no claim can prevail where the United
States, through its political branches, does not acquiesce in an
international norm. 59
The dissent explains that a rule of customary international law is not
binding in U.S. courts without U.S. consent because in the absence of
consent it cannot meet the requirement of universality articulated in the
Marcos H case. 60 This statement is correct doctrinally, for a rule of
customary international law cannot be deemed universal if it is not
recognized by the home nation of the court applying the rule. Further,
the political branches of the U.S. retain ultimate power over the content
of international legal obligations:
The federal common law's incorporation of the law of nations, in
short, is not beyond the political branches' power to alter. And this
fact is entirely consonant with the principle, expressed in our cases as
elsewhere, that "customary international law, like international law
defined by treaties and other international agreements, rests on the
consent of states." Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965
F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992); see id. ("A state that persistently
objects to a norm of customary international law that other states
accept is not bound by that norm .. " (citing Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States [hereinafter
61
Restatement] § 102 cmt. d)).
The dissent's position is consistent with recognizing state practice as the
ultimate baseline for determining a rule of customary international law.
State practice cannot be said to confirm a rule of customary international
law when the very state applying the rule has consistently objected to it
or refused to incorporate it into national law through the appropriate
legislative channels. It must be pointed out that in the instant case the
U.S. government expressly authorized the abduction that formed the
basis of the plaintiffs claims. Therefore the dissent correctly states, "an
ATCA plaintiff relying on the law of nations (as opposed to a treaty)
must allege a tort that violates some norm of international law
recognized by the United States. 62 To hold otherwise would allow
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 647.
Id. See In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994).
Alvarez-Machain,331 F.3dat 649.
Id. at 650.
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international sources of law to supersede the laws properly enacted by
democratically elected representatives of the people of the U.S. The
judiciary would exceed its constitutional mandate by enforcing laws not
assented to by the political branches of the government.63 To summarize,
in order to be actionable in U.S. courts, a principle of customary
international law must be incorporated into the laws of the U.S. by the
appropriate democratic processes.
There is one category of international law rules from which, some
commentators claim, states are not permitted to derogate. Commentators
have described jus cogens as holding "the highest hierarchical position
among all other norms and principles. As a consequence of that
standing, jus cogens norms are deemed to be 'peremptory' and 'nonderogable.' 64 The concept ofjus cogens was first discussed by scholars
of international law following World War 165 and finds its textual
explication in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.6 6 Before
determining the status ofjus cogens in U.S. courts, it is important to note
that the U.S. is not a party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. Furthermore,
Only ninety-one other states are parties. By comparison, 189 states
are members of the United Nations. That is, fewer than half the
states in the world have bound themselves to the Vienna Convention,
and thus to a treaty obligation to accept the jus cogens concept. If
U.S. courts are to treat the concept as a part of international law, then
they must justify their action by relying on some source of law other
than either a treaty obligation of the United States
or near universal
67
acceptance by states through a multilateral treaty.
As Weisburg points out, the jus cogens concept cannot derive its
authority in U.S. courts from universal or near universal acceptance by
states. Therefore U.S. courts must find some other justification for
relying on thejus cogens concept as a rule of decision in a given case.
The Ninth Circuit (majority opinion) took the opportunity to
distinguish the concept ofjus cogens from customary international law:
In contrast, jus cogens embraces customary laws considered binding
on all nations and is derived from values taken to be fundamental by
63.

See id.
See 1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW/40 (2d ed. 1999). See
also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 515 (5th ed. 1998) ("The
major distinguishing feature of [us cogens] rules is their relative indelibility.").
65. A. Mark Weisburd, American Judges and International Law, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1475, 1489 (2003).
66. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, pt. V2, art.
53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344; 8 I.L.M. 679, 698-99 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
67. Weisburd, supra note 65, at 1489.
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the international community, rather than from the fortuitous or selfinterested choices of nations. Whereas customary international law
derives solely from the consent of states, the fundamental68 and
universal norms constitutingjus cogens transcend such consent.
The court then stated that a violation of a jus cogens norm would be
sufficient to warrant an actionable claim under the ATCA. 69 The court
was mistaken in this holding for several reasons. First of all, as noted by
another federal appellate court, "the content of the jus cogens
doctrine.., emanates from academic commentary and multilateral
treaties, even when unsigned by the United States., 70 Therefore the jus
cogens doctrine as a source of law within U.S. courts suffers from the
same infirmity as customary international law generally: it is not based
on any positive enactment of Congress (or even on the consent of states),
but on the writings of academics. Indeed, as noted earlier, many states
have not subscribed to the jus cogens concept at all, nor have they taken
the further step of specifying what norms fall within that category.
Additionally, the problem of defining what norms of international
law have achieved the status ofjus cogens proves an imprecise endeavor
by any measure:
The absence of agreement among international law scholars is so
striking that one commentator expressed the status ofjus cogens in
the following terms: "no one knows where jus cogens comes from,
no one knows whether or how or why it is part of international law,
no one knows its content, no one knows how to modify it once
' 71 it is
articulated, and indeed no one knows whether it even exists.
Therefore, violation of an alleged jus cogens norm cannot by itself
provide a cause of action for plaintiffs in federal court. Plaintiffs must
instead look to positive law enacted by the Congress, or alternatively to
the common law as developed in courts of the U.S.72 For it is the
Congress, not the Judiciary, that possesses the power to create a federal
cause of action. The Sampson court explains this issue: "Absent

68. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 613 (citing Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (1992).
69. Id.
70. Sampson v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1155 (7th Cir. 2001).
71. Id. (quoting Anthony D'Amato, Human Rights as Part of Customary
InternationalLaw: A Pleafor Change of Paradigms,25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47, 57
(1995-1996)).
72. For example, a claim for torture would be supported in common law as a tort
irrespective of its status as ajus cogens norm, because torture is sufficiently well defined
and accepted by civilized nations. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir.
1980) ("[Flor purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become-like the pirate and slave
trader before him- hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind").
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congressional direction, such overactive involvement by our judiciary
would challenge
the consent-based structure of our constitutional
73
system.,
Some of the confusion over the proper role in U.S. courts of both
jus cogens and customary international law may be explained by the
changing nature of the obligations governed by these doctrines. The
modern evolution ofjus cogens and customary international law norms
has witnessed a shift away from regulating the relationships between
states in the international arena. The new jus cogens and customary
international law norms instead focus on governing the relationships
between a nation and its citizens:
[I]n contrast to the traditional CIL that primarily governed relations
between nations, the CIL applied in the post-Filartiga period almost
exclusively regulates relations between a nation and its citizens on
such matters as torture, capital punishment, inhuman and degrading
treatment, prolonged arbitrary
detention, and freedom of thought,
74
conscience, and religion.
The list of potential violations of customary international law continues
to grow, and some human rights advocates would like to see the list
expand in an open-ended fashion:
"As a leading authority on
international human rights has observed, 'given the rapid continued
development of international human rights, the list as now constituted
should be regarded as essentially open-ended.... Many other rights will
be added in the course of time.' ' 75 Courts looking to the writings of
academics may soon begin to recognize a virtually unlimited number of
individual rights based on customary international law.7 6
While the concept ofjus cogens should not govern the relationships
between the U.S. and its citizens in federal court, the concept does have
some utility in international tribunals. For example, a nation suing the
U.S. in the International Court of Justice might rely on the concept ofjus
cogens in defining international obligations among states. The ICJ, as an
international institution, may rely on international law to provide a rule
of decision in a case, without the need for incorporation from another
branch of government. Thejus cogens concept therefore finds its proper
role within the international, not the domestic, legal system.
73. Sampson, 250 F.3dat 1155.
74. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, FederalCourts and the Incorporationof
InternationalLaw, 111 HARV. L. REv. 2260, 2264 (1998).
75. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 816, 841
(1997) (quoting THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS
CUSTOMARY LAW 99 (1989)).
76. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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Conclusion

United States courts are currently addressing important questions of
international law that should be decided in accordance with the
Constitution of the United States and the separation of powers principle.
Specifically, the courts must respect the will of Congress when
interpreting treaties and the private rights they provide in federal courts.
The courts should define customary international law by reference to
state practice and in this context must be careful not to give inappropriate
weight to the writings of academics. As a further matter, courts should
not look to the concept of jus cogens or customary international law
generally when defining legal relationships between the United States
and its own citizens. In sum, concerns of democratic accountability and
respect for the sovereignty of the United States and the constitutionally
based separation of powers principle buttress the doctrinal contention
that it is the duty of Congress to incorporate international law into federal
law through the appropriate democratic processes.
The incorporation of international law into U.S. law may be a
laudable goal, especially with respect to human rights law, but the ends
cannot justify improper means. Judges and law professors wishing for
the rule of international law in U.S. courts must respect the Constitution
of the United States and await further action by the democratically
elected officials in the legislative branch of government.

